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It is often argued that more competitive environments foster eﬃciency; however, the theoretical
work in support of this proposition is fragmented. Although economists have gained a good
understanding of the properties of both monopolistic and perfectly competitive markets, the
welfare properties of what lies in between are still not entirely understood; except for the most
stylised environments — such as the standard Cournot and Bertrand settings, where eﬃciency
is (weakly) increasing in the number of market participants — the relationship between welfare
and toughness of competition has not been generally characterized. A recent body of literature
— such as Stole (1995), Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) — has worked
towards ﬁlling this gap, by focussing on the properties of the equilibrium contracts oﬀered by
horizontally diﬀerentiated duopolists, who compete in price-quality menus to attract consumers
whose preferences are unobservable. Their ﬁndings support the view that competition promotes
eﬃciency: the duopoly outcome is generally qualitatively similar to the monopoly outcome, but
distortions are reduced. Moreover, Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001)
ﬁnd a remarkable result: conditional on suﬃciently ﬁerce competition, all distortions disappear,
and the equilibrium quality allocations are eﬃcient1.
This work adds to this literature, by showing that, with respect to the monopoly scenario,
duopolistic competition may introduce new types of distortions, namely upward distortions; the
presence of a competitor induces each ﬁrm to engage in a sort of “arms’ race”, that results in the
overprovision of quality for suﬃciently low types. Hence, competition may result in a waste of
resources.2 This suggests that the relationship between “toughness of competition” and welfare
may not necessarily be monotonic. Although in perfectly competitive environments the eﬃcient
allocation of resources always emerges, environments characterized by oligopolistic competition
are not necessarily more eﬃcient than those characterized by a monopoly.
This paper possesses two dinstinctive features: the ﬁrst concerns the assumption that each
ﬁrm operates both within a local market — where it is a monopolist — and a competitive market
— where it competes against another ﬁrm. This division betwen markets may be interpreted
either in a literal way, as modeling markets that are geographically separated, or as capturing
1Inderst (2001) ﬁnds a related result in a matching model of buyer-seller exchange.
2Indeed, the idea that competition may be socially wasteful is well known in the literature that studies
competition in health care, and in particular competition among hospitals (see for instance Feldstein, 1971, Held
and Pauly, 1983 and Robinson and Luft, 1985). In these markets, the presence of health insurance dampens the
patients’ sensitivity to cost and price diﬀerences among hospitals. In turn, insensitivity to price leads hospitals
to compete through the provision of medically unnecessary services. As will become clear below, the intuition for
the overprovision result obtained in the present paper is fundamentally diﬀerent.
1the fact that consumers may diﬀer in their switching costs. Crucially, it is assumed that ﬁrms
cannot discriminate between consumers located in diﬀerent markets. This may be the case if
ﬁrms cannot directly observe each consumer’s market location, or if ﬁrms can observe market
location, but are not allowed to discriminate according to it.3 From the point of view of each
ﬁrm, the presence of two markets is therefore equivalent to a situation where the consumer’s
reservation utility can be either equal to zero — when he is located in the local market — or taking
a positive value — when he is located in the competitive market — with a positive probability.
The second distinctive feature of this paper concerns the assumption that the consumer’s
marginal valuation of quality is determined by his preferences over horizontal product character-
istics: a consumer who prefers brand A over brand B derives more utility from an increase in the
quality of good A rather than increase in the quality of good B. Moreover, the change in utility
experienced by swiching from A to B is an increasing function of the consumer’s valuation for
quality when purchasing A. Hence, consumers who purchase goods of higher quality also have
stronger brand preferences. From the point of view of each ﬁrm/brand, this implies that the
competitive pressure generated by the presence of a rival ﬁrm is strongest for intermediate types.
This is because high/low consumer types are strongly biased in favour of one brand, and are
therefore reluctant to switch. Intermediate consumer types, on the other hand, are relatively
brand-insensitive. Hence, competition between rival ﬁrms is concentrated on these intermediate
types. The motivation for this way of modeling preferences is empirical, and comes from the ob-
servation that, in some markets, consumers who purchase higher qualities are more brand-loyal
than those who purchase lower qualities.4
Together, these two features ensure that the mass of types with whom each ﬁrm contracts
is strictly positive for all types5, but experiences an upward jump as we move from low to high
consumer types. This is because consumers with low valuations purchase the ﬁrm’s product
only when they have no viable alternative, i.e. when they are located in the ﬁrm’s local market,
while consumers with high valuations purchase the ﬁrm’s product independently of their market
location. Moreover, the price elasticities of demand possess the following feature: if the ﬁrm
decreases its pricing schedule by a small amount6, the units sold at high/low quality levels
3The following illustration is taken from Armstrong and Vickers (1993): prior to 1988, British Gas was free to
set prices to its large consumers without any constraint on price discrimination. Customers without an alternative
source of energy supply complained that they were charged more than the less captive customers. British Gas’s
freedom to discriminate was removed following the Monopolies and Mergers Commission Report that ensued.
4This is for instance well documented within the car market, as shown in Goldberg (1995), Berry, Lewinsohn
and Pakes (1995), Feenstra and Lewinsohn (1995). Indeed, Verboven (1996) calls this feature a stilized fact of
this market.
5In contrast, if the ﬁrmsoperated only in the competitive market, each ﬁrm would only contract with suﬃciently
high types.
6That is, if the price-quality schedule is shifted downward by a small constant.
2remain unchanged, and the only increase occurs at intermediate quality levels. As will become
clear below, these characteristics are the key for our results.
1.1 Relationship wih the existing literature
The literature that studies nonlinear pricing in duopoly settings mainly consists of Stole (1995),
Rochet and Stole (2002) and Armstrong and Vickers (2001). All three papers focus on the be-
havior of ﬁrms that operate within only one market. Stole (1995) shares the assumption made
in the present paper, that a consumer’s valuation of quality is determined by the nature of his
preferences over horizontal (brand) product characteristics, but assumes that the consumer’s
preferences over vertical product chracteristics are perfectly observable. Rochet and Stole (2002)
and Armstrong and Vickers (2001) consider a duopoly setting in which the unobservable prefer-
ences over vertical and horizontal product characteristics are uncorrelated. This ensures smooth
demand eﬀects: if a ﬁrm decreases its price schedule, the units it sells at every quality level
increase. In other words, competition occurs over all quality levels. In contrast, in the present
setting, a correlation exists between a consumer’s marginal valuation of quality and his prefer-
ences over horizontal product characteristics. As a consequence, competition between the two
ﬁrms is concentrated on intermediate quality levels.
The paper to which the present work is most closely connected is Rochet and Stole (2002),
that is therefore utilized as a benchmark.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the general model,
while section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 concludes. All the proofs which are not in the
main text can be found in the appendix.
2 The model
There are three players in the game: the consumer and the two producers/ﬁrms, denoted as l
and r, standing for “left” and “right”. The consumer may consume either zero or one unit of
an indivisible good, which can be produced by either ﬁrm. More speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm can only
produce a certain variety of the good: ﬁrm l can only produce variety (or brand) L, while ﬁrm r
can only produce variety R. Also, each ﬁrm can produce the good at any quality level q ∈ [0,Q],
where Q is assumed to be ﬁnite but very large. Quality is an objectively measurable product
characteristic.
There are three markets, denoted as ml, mr and mc, where c stands for “competitive”.
Market ml (respectively, mr)i sﬁ r ml’ s (respectively, ﬁrm r’s) local market. That is, ﬁrm l is
3market ml’s sole producer, and ﬁrm r is market mr’s sole producer. Market mc, on the other
hand, is supplied by both ﬁrms. Thus, each ﬁrm operates in two markets: its local market, and
market mc.
The consumer’s private information is two-dimensional, and concernsboth his preferences over
product characteristics and his market location, which may be either ml, mr or mc. Conditional
on purchasing from ﬁrm i, i = r,l, the consumer is located in ﬁrm i’s local market with probability
s, and is located in market mc with probability 1 − s, for some s ∈ ]0,1[.T h u s ,s indicates the
relative size of the local markets7, with respect to market mc.
Within each market, the consumer is located on an hypothetical segment of length z ∈
]0,1[, measured between 0 and z; location over this segment is drawn according to a uniform8
distribution. The intensity of the consumer’s horizontal preferences with respect to a given brand
is inversely proportional to the distance between the consumer’s and the brand’s location. It
is assumed that brands L and R are located at the extremities of the segment; that is, we set
brand L’s position at zero, and brand R’s position at z. This corresponds to a situation of
maximal product diﬀerentiation9. The parameter z is therefore a measure of both the dispersion
of the consumer’s preferences and the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation between the varieties
sold by the two ﬁrms. As m a l lz characterizes markets where consumer preferences are relatively
homogeneous and the varieties sold by the two ﬁrms are close substitutes. Vice-versa, a large z
characterizes markets where consumer preferences are strongly heterogeneous, and the varieties
sold by the two ﬁrms are very dissimilar.
The consumer’s preferences over vertical product characteristics are entirely determined by
his brand preferences. That is, the consumer’s marginal valuation of quality varies across brands
according to the nature and intensity of his horizontal preferences. Denoting as ki(y), i = l,r
the marginal valuation of quality of a consumer located at y consuming the good produced by
ﬁrm i we have
kl(y)=1− y and
kr(y)=1− z + y
7In order to keep things as simple as possible, I only consider the case in which the two ﬁrms are perfectly
symmetric, i.e. sl = sr = s.
8The assumption that the consumer’s horizontal preferences are uniformly distributed ensures the perfect
symmetry exists between the two producers, which in turn simpliﬁes the analysis.
9D’Aspremont et al. (1979) show that, for quadratic trasportation costs, the equilibium of the two-stage game
where (1) ﬁrms simultaneously choose their locations and (2) taking their locations as given, ﬁrms compete in
prices, has the two ﬁrms locating at the extremities of the segment. The assumption of maximal diﬀerentiation
can therefore be interpreted as hypothesizing the validity of this result when, in the second stage of the game,
ﬁrms compete in price-quality menus.
4Notice that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between kl(y) and kr(y), given by:
kr(y)=2− z − kl(y) (1)
In what follows we refer to ki as the consumer’s type when purchasing from ﬁrm i. From the
point of view of each ﬁrm i, ki within each market is uniformly distributed on [1 − z,1].
The utility of a consumer of type ki = k purchasing quality q at price p from ﬁrm i is equal
to
ui(k,p,q)=kq − p
While his utility if he purchases quality q at price p from ﬁrm −i is
u−i(k,p,q)=( 2− z −k)q − p
This is the case because from (1) we have k−i =2− z − ki. Notice that the consumer’s market
location has no eﬀect upon his utility from consumption. Instead, this is entirely determined by
consumer’s prefererence over horizaontal product characteristics. Finally, if the consumer does
not consume the good at all, his utility is equal to 0.
The two ﬁrms are perfectly symmetric. If a ﬁrm sells a product of quality q at price p, its
p a y o ﬀi se q u a lt op −
q2
2 , while if it does not sell anything, its payoﬀ is equal to zero. Hence,
production does not entail any ﬁxed cost.10
Competition between the ﬁrms takes the form of a simultaneous oﬀer of price-quality menus.
Speciﬁcally, each ﬁrm i = l,r competes by oﬀering a nonlinear price schedule pi(qi) from which
the consumer can chose a quality if he decides to purchase the product. We restrict attention to
non-random pricing schedules.
Each ﬁrm’s problem consists of designing a menu of contracts (or mechanism), from which
the consumer may chose his preferred choice, conditional on purchase. At equilibrium each ﬁrm
selects the optimal mechanism, taking the other ﬁrm’s mechanism as given. From the revelation
principle, we know that the search for the optimal menu of contracts may be conﬁned to the set of
direct revelation mechanisms, whereby the consumer is requested to report his type, and is oﬀered
a contract which is contingent upon his report. As mentioned above, the consumer’s utility from
consumption only depends upon his horizontal preferences, and is independent of the market
10Salop (1979) was the ﬁrst to note how, in the presence of ﬁxed costs of entry, more competition may result
in lower total welfare. The private incentive for a ﬁrm to enter a market is higher than the social incentive,
because the latter ignores the proﬁts that are generated by the ﬁrm from “stealing the business” of incumbents.
This fundamentally diﬀers from the rationale for the results obtained in the present paper, where ﬁxed costs are
assumed to be irrelevant.
5in which he is located. Hence, although the consumer’s private information is two-dimensional,
his type-space — deﬁned as any private information that is relevant to the consumer’s decision-
making, conditional on purchasing from a given ﬁrm — is uni-dimensional. It is therefore without
loss of generality that we consider direct revelation mechanisms of the form {qi(ki),p i(ki)} in
the analysis which follows. That is, we consider a direct revelation mechanism, taking the
consumer’s decision to purchase from the ﬁrm as given. For any given mechanism oﬀered by ﬁrm
i, we indicate the indirect utility of a consumer of type ki = k who truthfully reveals his type as
ui(k). Throughout the analysis we concentrate on symmetric, pure strategy equilibria.
The consumer’s reservation utility (or, equivalently, his outside option) when contracting
with a given ﬁrm is deﬁned as the highest utility which the consumer could obtain when not
dealing with this ﬁrm. Thus, the consumer’s reservation utility varies according to the market
in which he is located. If the consumer is located in market mi, i = l,r his reservation utility
when contracting with ﬁrm i is given by 0; this is because ﬁrm i is the sole active producer in
market mi. If the consumer is located in market mc, on the other hand, his reservation utility is
given by max{0, u−i(2 − z −k)}.
3I m p l i c a t i o n s
Consider ﬁrm i = l,r. The utility obtained by a consumer of type ki = k when contracting with
ﬁrm i is equal to ui(k). The consumer’s outside option when contracting with i depends upon
his market location. If the consumer is located in market mi, his outside option is zero. If the
consumer is located in market mc, his outside option is equal to
Bi (k) ≡ max(0, u−i (2 − z − k))
where u−i(2 − z −k) is the highest payoﬀ which a consumer with marginal valuation k−i =
2 − z − k obtains when contracting with ﬁrm −i, ﬁrm i’s rival. Notice that u−i(2 − z − k)
i saf u n c t i o no fk, the consumer’s type when contracting with ﬁrm i. Hence, the consumer’s
outside option when located in the competitive market is type-dependent. This is in contrast
with the standard monopoly situation, where all types of consumers typically have the same
outside option. An additional departure from the standard model arises in the present setting
from the inability of ﬁrms to observe the consumer’s market location; this matters because, for
any given type k, market location aﬀects the consumer’s outside option. From each ﬁrm’s point
of view, the situation is therefore equivalent to one where the outside option of a purchasing
consumer is randomly drawn: with probability s,i ti se q u a lt o0, while with probability 1 −s it
6is equal to Bi (k) ≥ 0.
The measure Mi (ui(k),k) of consumers of type k who contract with ﬁrm i is given by:
Mi(ui(k),k)=

         
         
1




z if Bi(k) >u i(k) ≥ 0
0 if ui(k) < 0
(2)
If ui (k) >B i (k), the consumer purchases ﬁrm i’s product with probability 1, independently of
his market location. If ui(k)=Bi (k), the consumer purchases ﬁrm i’ s product with probability 1
only if he is located in market mi, while if he is located in market mc he randomizaes, purchasing
from each ﬁrm with probability 1/2. If Bi(k) >u i (k) ≥ 0 the consumer purchases ﬁrm i’s
product only if he is located in market mi. Finally, if ui (k) < 0 the consumer never purchases
ﬁrm i’s product.
Conditional on the consumer’s truthfully declaring his type, the ﬁrm’s proﬁt when contracting




. Substituting for pi(k)=kqi (k) − ui (k) this becomes




























Lemma 1: The following conditions are necessary and suﬃcient for incentive compatibility:
IC.1 u￿
i(k)=qi(k)
IC.2 qi(k) is non-decreasing in k.
Condition IC.1 is the ﬁrst order condition for local incentive compatibility, while condition
IC.2 is the second-order condition. Together, these two conditions ensure global incentive com-
7patibility. In what follows, we study the properties of the mechanism obtained when imposing
condition IC.1 only. In the appendix, we show that the properties so derived also extend to the
overall optimal mechanism.
Lemma 1 identiﬁes the conditions which need to hold for both ﬁrms at equilibrium. This
allows us to make some inferences concerning the consumer’s reservation utility, when he is
located in market mc. From above, we know that
Bi (k) ≡ max(0, u−i (2 − z − k))
Hence, B￿
i(k) is either equal to 0 or it is equal to −u￿
−i(2 − z − k). From lemma 1, we know that
−u
￿
−i(2 − z − k)=−q−i (2 − z − k) → ≤ 0
where q−i (2 − z − k) denotes the product quality which a consumer of type k−i =2− z − k is
oﬀered when contracting with ﬁrm −i.T h u s ,B￿
i(k) is non-positive. Moreover, from lemma 1,
the utility schedules oﬀered by the two ﬁrms at equilibrium must be continuous. This brings us
to the following lemma.
Lemma 2: At equilibrium, the consumer’s reservation utility when he is located in market
mc is continuous and non-increasing in his type.
Lemma 2 characterizes the properties of the consumer’s reservation utility in any symmetric
equilibrium. Deﬁne ﬁrm i’s marginal type kM













Because Bi (k) is non-increasing in type, we can rewrite the measure Mi (ui (k),k) of con-
11We are implicitely assuming that the ui (k) and Bi(k) schedules do not overlap for more than one type. This
may however be the case if ui (k)=Bi(k)=0for a whole set of types. In that case, the marginal type is deﬁned
as the highest type for whom ui (k)=Bi (k).
8sumers of type k who contract with ﬁrm i as12:
Mi(ui(k),k)=

   
   
s






2z for k = kM
i
1





This is the case because the ui(k) and Bi(k) schedules increase in opposite directions. Hence,
they may cross only at one type. The implication is that Mi(ui(k),k) has a discontinuity at
k = kM
i . This is in contrast with Rochet-Stole (2002), where the ﬁrm’s market share is a
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   






2z for k = kM
i





The increment in ﬁrm i’s market share that results from a marginal rise in the consumer’s utility
is also discontinuous function of the consumer’s type. Intuitively, from the deﬁnition of kM
i , all
types above kM
i purchase ﬁrm i’s product with probability one, independently of their market
location. Hence, an increment in the utility oﬀered to those types does not modify the probability
with which they purchase ﬁrm i’s product. Now consider those types located below kM
i .F o r
those types, Bi (k) >u i (k). Denoting the increment in the utility obtained when contracting
with ﬁrm i as ε,w eh a ve Bi (k) >u i (k)+ε for ε suﬃciently small. Hence, for types located
below kM
i a marginal increment is not suﬃcient to alter their purchasing behaviour when located
in the competitive market. Finally, consider type kM





















+ε for any ε>0. By marginally increasing the utility that type kM
i obtains,
ﬁrm i is able to increase its market share; this is the case because the ﬁrm now trades with type
kM
i with probability 1, rather than (1 + s)/2.
Hence, the price elasticities of demand possess the following feature: if ﬁrm i decreases its











remain unchanged. Again, this is in contrast with
Rochet-Stole (2002), where the consumer’s reservation utility is a smooth function of his type,
12If ui(k)=Bi(k)=0for a whole set of types, the measure Mi (ui(k),k) of consumers of type k who contract
with ﬁrm i is
Mi(ui(k),k)=
￿s+1












9and demand eﬀects are accordingly smooth.





qi(x)dx →≥ ui(1 − z)
Hence, setting ui (1 − z) ≥ 0 is suﬃcient to ensure the participation of all types located in the
local market mi. This is because these types have a null outside option, and will therefore accept
any contract that gives them a non-negative utility. There is therefore no loss of generality in
restricting attention to the case where each ﬁrm contracts will all types with a positive probability.
In what follows, however, we will use the term “trade” as a synonym for “surplus-creating
trade”, i.e. to designate situations where the consumer and the ﬁrm trade a good that has stictly
positive quality. Contracts that prescribe trade of a good of null quality will be designated as
“null contracts”, involving no trade.
We now explore the properties of the optimal mechanism. If we ignore monotonicity concerns,

















i (ki)=qi (ki) (IC1)
In the canonical setting, where the ﬁrm under consideration is a monopolist, the consumer’s
reservation utility corresponds to the utility the consumer derives if he foregoes consumption
altogether, and is therefore equal to zero for all types. When this is the case, setting ui(1 −z) ≥ 0
is suﬃcient to ensure the participation of all consumers. Here, in contrast, the consumer ’s
reservation utility when located in market mc is equal to the utility he derives from purchasing
the product sold by the ﬁrm’s rival, and is therefore strictly positive for a non-empty set of types.
Hence, although setting ui(1 − z) ≥ 0 is suﬃcient to ensure the participation of all types located
in the local market mi, this is not necessarily the case for those consumers located in market mc,
the competitivemarket. The implication is that an upward shift in the consumer’s utility schedule
may allow ﬁrm i to expand its market share. This is in contrast with the standard setting, where
an upward shift in the consumer’s utility schedule has no impact upon the monopolist’s sales
volume.
The consequences of this extra eﬀect upon the optimal mechanism can be be best illustrated
10in a ﬁnite-type setting. Suppose that the type-set is discrete, with N components, each of lenght



























































































A change in ui (1 − z) generates a shift in the consumer’s utility schedule. This has two eﬀects:
on one hand, it aﬀects the rents allocated to the consumer, whenever he purchases from ﬁrm
i; this eﬀect is captured by the ﬁrst term in (6). On the other hand, however, a shift in the
consumer’s utility schedule also alters the ﬁrm’s market share. This eﬀect is captured by the
second term in (6). Figure 1 illustrates how an increment in ui(1 −z) allows ﬁrm i to increase its
market share. The upward shift in the consumer’s utility schedule that arises from the increment
in ui (1 − z) results in the ﬁrm’s marginal type moving from kM
i to kM￿
i <k M
i . The range of











The presence of this market share eﬀect of a change in ui (1 − z) has important implications
for the equilibrium contract. In particular, it may induce the ﬁrm to optimally set ui(1 − z) > 0.
This is in contrast with the standard monopoly setting, where the participation constraint of the
















The derivative of (5) with respect to qi (k) is





















In addition to the standard eﬃciency/informational rents trade-oﬀ the ﬁrm is confronted with
an extra eﬀect, that arises from the fact that by increasing qi (k) the ﬁrm can enlarge the mass of
types with whom it contracts. This eﬀect — captured by the last term in (7) — emerges because
a change in qi(k) generates a shift in the consumer’s utility schedule, that initiates at ui(k+
1
N).
I nas i m i l a rm a n n e rt oam o ve m e n ti n ui(1−z), a movement in qi (k) might therefore aﬀect ﬁrm
i’s market share. Importantly, however, this maket share eﬀect of a change in qi (k) arises only
for types situated below kM
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2z for k = kM
i





Hence, in order for a marginal shift in the utility schedule to have an impact upon the ﬁrm’s
market share, it is necessary that the shift aﬀect the utility oﬀered to the marginal type kM
i .I n
12turn, this can only be generated by a movement in the quality allocation of types situated below
kM
i
A second important observation is that the market share eﬀect of a marginal increment in
qi(k) is the same for all k<k M
i . Intuitively, for an arbitrarily small shift in the consumer’s utility
schedule, kM￿
i tends to kM
i . In that case, the expansion in ﬁrm i’s market share consists in the
ﬁrm trading with type kM
i with probability 1, rather than (1 + s)/2. The extra proﬁt that this
generates is independent of the precise location at which the shift is initiated. This is in contrast
with Rochet-Stole (2002), where the market share eﬀect of an upward shift in the consumer’s
utility schedule depends upon the location at which the shift begins.
The intuitions derived in the ﬁnite-type setting carry over to the continuous-type case. As





















and the optimal quality allocation in the absence of bunching satisﬁes





















The last term in (E2) captures the market share eﬀect generated by a marginal upward shift in
ui(k +ε),f o rs o m eε arbitrarily small. As discussed above, for types located above the marginal
type this eﬀect is null; as a result, for those types the optimal quality allocation is found by
optimally balancing informational rents and eﬃciency — the same trade-oﬀ as in the canonical
monopoly setting. Generally, therefore, for suﬃciently high types the familiar Mussa and Rosen
(1978) result of underprovision and “eﬃciency at the top” also persists in the duopoly setting.
This brings us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For suﬃciently high types, the optimal quality allocation exhibits the same
properties as that oﬀered by a monopolist. In any equilibrium where the marginal type is the
lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade, this is the case for all types.
Although undeprovision and “eﬃciency at the top” persist for suﬃciently high types, for
lower types the competitive stimulus provided by the presence of a rival might induce ﬁrms to
13oﬀer quality levels that are above those that would be oﬀered by a monopolist. As proposition
2 indicates, this is always the case whenever z is suﬃciently small.
Proposition 2: When the marginal type is not the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade, the
quality level oﬀered to suﬃciently low types is above what would be oﬀered by a monopolist. A





Intuitively, a smaller z corresponds to a higher the degree of substitutability between the
brands sold by the two ﬁrms, and therefore to a more competitive environment. When com-
petition is suﬃciently strong, ﬁrms have an incentive to inﬂate the quality levels they oﬀer to
suﬃciently low types. This is because, through incentive compatibility, higher quality oﬀers to
low types directly translate into higher utility oﬀers to higher types. Hence, by oﬀering higher
quality levels to low types, each ﬁrm is able to increase its market share in market mc.








−0.37s − 0.19s2 +1 .56 + 0.5
￿
, the threshold value of
z below which competition starts to bite. This value is increasing in s, reaching 1 for s → 1.
This is because, as seen above, the market share eﬀect is only present for suﬃciently low types,
namely those that are located below the marginal type; hence, the presence of competition may
alter the equilibrium quality schedule only in equilibria where ﬁrms trade with types located
below the marginal type, i.e. with types that contract with the ﬁrm only when they are located
in the ﬁrm’s local market. Larger local markets — that is, a larger s — make trade with these
types more attractive, and therefore increase the likelyhood of obtaining quality levels that are
above those that would be oﬀered by a monopolist.








Proposition 2 tells us that, conditional on rivalry being suﬃciently strong, the presence of
competition reduces the distortions that are associated with monopoly power. This suggests
that competition might be welfare-enhancing. The next proposition shows that this intuition
might be misguided: when competition is very ﬁerce, the presence of a rival induces ﬁrms to
14ineﬃciently inﬂate the quality oﬀered to low types. Hence, with respect to a monopoly setting,
competition might introduce new distortions, namely upward distortions.





3s−3 any symmetric equilibrium exhibits overprovision
for suﬃciently low types.
The proof of proposition 3 consists in two steps. First, we show that if at equilibrium we
have ui(1 −z) > 0, the optimal quality schedule always features overprovision for suﬃciently low
types. Hence, overprovision may not occur if and only if ui (1 − z)=0at equilibrium. Second,
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￿
, any equilibrium where ui(1 −z)=0must
also exhibit overprovision for suﬃciently low types.
The intuition for the ﬁrst part of the proof can be seen as follows: at an interior solution,
the optimal ui(1 − z) balances the ﬁrm’s desire to enlarge his market share on one hand, and
his desire to minimize the rents that have to be oﬀered to the agent in order to ensure incentive
compatibility on the other. Now consider the ﬁrm’s choice of qi(1 −z); this choice is determined
by the interplay of three factors: the desire to expand the market share, the desire to minimize
the informational rents that have to be oﬀered to the consumer, and the the desire to maximize
the total surplus obtained when contracting with type 1−z. Because ui (1 − z) has been chosen
optimally, however, the ﬁrst two factors annull each other; hence, in his contractual oﬀer to type
1 − z, the principal has no incentive to deviate from the eﬃcient quality level. Now consider a
type k,l o c a t e da b o ve 1 − z but below the marginal type kM
i . Evaluated at k, the market share
eﬀect has the same strenght as for type 1 − z, but the increment in informational rents that
result from an increase in qi(k) is strictly lower than that arising from an increase in qi(1 − z).
This is because, in the present setting, the incentive compatibility constraint binds downwards;
higher valuation types need to be oﬀered rents in order to be dissuaded from understating their
true valuations. It follows that the principal’s incentive to increase quality must be higher for
type k ∈
￿
1 − z, kM
i
￿
than for type 1 −z. Given that qi (1 − z) is equal to the eﬃcient level, we
conclude that qi(k) must be above the eﬃcient level.
The second part of the proof shows that, when z is suﬃciently small, a situation where
u−i(1 −z) =0and overprovision does not occur for any type, the consumer’s reservation utility
would be suﬃciently low to give ﬁrm i an incentive to capture a share of the competitive market
that is above 1/2. Clearly, this cannot be the case in any symmetric equilibrium.
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￿
, the threshold value of z below which over-
provision occurs for suﬃciently low types. This value is a decreasing function of s, the size of the
local market. Intuitively, ﬁrms will ﬁnd it worthwhile to introduce distortions aimed at increasing
their market share in the competitive market only if 1−s, the density of consumers located in this
market, is suﬃciently high. Moreover, when s is small the expected cost of distorting the quality
levels oﬀered to suﬃciently low types is also small. This is because low types only contract with
ﬁrm i when they are located in ﬁrm i’s local market. If the likelyhood of contracting with those
types is small — that is, if s is small — the ﬁrm is less reluctant to introduce these distortions.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper contributes to the literature that studies nonlinear pricing within a duopoly setting in
which products are spatially diﬀerentiated a la Hotelling (1929). Its novelty consists in combining
two empirically sound features — namely the notion that ﬁrms may be serving monopolistic as
well as competitive markets and the assumption that consumers who have a higher valuation
for quality are also more brand loyal — and showing that these have important implications for
the relationship between “toughness of competition” and welfare. In particular, we ﬁnd that
a strongly competitive environment will induce ﬁrms to ineﬃciently inﬂate the quality levels
that they are oﬀering to suﬃciently low types. As a consequence, stronger competition may not
necessarily result in higher eﬃciency. This suggests that the relationship between “toughness of
competition” and welfare may not be monotonic.
165 Appendix
P r o o fo fl e m m a1 :
The proof is standard and will be omitted.
Proof of lemma 2:
In text.




















qi (k) non decreasing in k
The structure of the problem is identical to that analyzed by Rochet-Stole (2002). The






























The Hamiltonian for the problem is:













￿ui)dk −λ(1)u(1) + λ(1 − z)u(1 − z)
17The necessary and suﬃcient conditions13for optimality are14:
λ(1 − z)=λ(1) = 0 (i)
λ










Mi(ui(k),k)(k −qi (k)) = −λ(k) (iii)




















From (i) we know that:
￿ 1
1−z λ

















Moreover, substituting for λ(k) in (iii), we obtain
Mi (ui,k )(k − qi (k))−
1 ￿
k














Condition (E1) is the ﬁrst order condition with respect to ui(1 − z). The ﬁrst term on the
lefthandside of (E1) captures the eﬀect that a marginal change in ui (1 − z) has upon the rents
that have to be oﬀered to all types. The second term on the lefthandside of (E1) captures the
market share eﬀect of a marginal change in ui (1 − z). If the lefthandside of (E1) is negative for
all ui(1 − z) ≥ 0, we have a corner solution, and the optimal ui(1 −z) is equal to zero. Condition
(E2) is the ﬁrst order condition with respect to qi(k). The ﬁrst term on the lefthadside of (E2)
captures the eﬀect that a marginal change in qi(k) has upon the surplus created from trade
between the ﬁrm and the consumer. The second term on the lefthadside of (E2) captures the
eﬀect that a marginal change in qi(k) has upon the informational rents that have to be oﬀered
to all types above k, in order to ensure incentive compatibility. The last term on the lefthadside
13See Rochet-Stole (2002), p.309.
14More precisely, condition (i) requires
λ(1) ≥ 0, λ(1)u(1) = 0
λ(1 −z) ≥ 0, λ(1 − z)u(1 −z)=0
Conditional on trade occurring, u(1) = 0 → λ(1) = 0. Moreover, at an interior solution, u(1−z) → λ(1−z)=0 .
18of (E2) captures the market share eﬀect of a marginal change in qi (k).


























for k ≤ kM
i
As mentioned in the main text, when k >k M
i the consumer is already purchasing ﬁrm i’s
product with probability one. For those types, therefore, an increment in the consumer’s utility
does not alter Mi(ui(k),k), the mass of consumers that trade with ﬁrm i. Hence, any upward
shift in the consumer’s utility schedule that starts at k>k M
i has no eﬀect upon the ﬁrm’s
expected proﬁt. Now consider an upward shift in the consumer’s utility schedule that starts at
some type k ≤ kM
i . Denote the size of this shift by ε. After the shift, ﬁrm i’s new marginal type
kM￿




























































Notice that limε→0￿ k = kM
i ; that is, when considering an inﬁnitesimally small shift, we can
approximate ￿ k = kM
i . Hence, the extra proﬁt the ﬁrm earns after a marginal shift in the
consumer’s utility schedule that starts at k ≤ kM
i is equal to the proﬁt that the ﬁrm gains from
trading with kM
i with probability 1, rather than (1 + s)/2.
We now proceed to prove proposition 1. First, we show that in equilibria where the lowest
type with whom ﬁrms trade is the marginal type, the optimal quality schedule exhibits the same
properties as that oﬀered by a monopolist. We then show that for suﬃciently high types, this is
the case in all equilibria.
Consider an equilibrium where the lowest type with whom each ﬁrm trades is the marginal
type. At equilibrium, all k<k M
i are oﬀered the null contract: qi(k)=0 .F o r k>k M
i ,t h e
optimal quality allocation is given by
Mi(ui,k )(k − qi (k)) =
1 ￿
k




(k − qi (k)) =
1 − k
z
→ q(k)=2 k − 1 (10)
For k = kM

























As discussed in the main text, for k ≥ kM
i the market share eﬀect of a marginal change in
qi(k) is null; this is because all types >k M
i are already purchasing from ﬁrm i with probability
one, independently of their market location. Hence, an increment in the utility level oﬀered to
those types does not alter the ﬁrm’s market share. We conclude that for k ≥ kM
i the trade-oﬀ
faced by the ﬁrm when deciding upon quality allocations is exactly the same as that faced by
a monopolist. By decreasing qi (k) below its eﬃcient level, the ﬁrm reduces the informational
rents that have to be allocated to all types above k; evaluated at qi (k)=qFB
i (k) — where
qFB
i (k) indicates the surplus-maximizing quality allocation for type k — this eﬀect dominates
the second-order eﬃciency loss generated by a marginal reduction in qi (k). Hence, the optimal
quality allocation prescribes underprovision for all types, except the highest. In the present
setting, qFB
i (k)m a x imizes kqi −
q2
i
2 , and is therefore equal to k. It can be easily veriﬁed that the





are below their surplus-maximizing value, while
the optimal quality allocation for the highest type is at the eﬃcient level.





In the equilibrium under consideration, all k<k M
i are oﬀered the null contract: qi(k)=0 .
Hence, ui(k)=ui (1 − z) for all k ≤ kM
i . When trading with k<k M
i , ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is equal to
−ui(1 − z). We now show that in any equilibrium where the lowest type with whom each ﬁrm
trades is the marginal type, we must have ui (1 − z)=0 . Suppose that this was not the case;
consider type kM




























. Under this new contract, the proﬁt ﬁrm i would earn when trading with types
≥ kM
i would remain unchanged, while that earned when trading with type kM



















































2 > 0. Notice that in
20the equilibrium under consideration, this inequality must necessarily hold. If this was not the
case, then surely the lefthandside of (E1) would be negative. This would contradict the initial
assumption that the optimal ui(1 − z) is strictly positive. Hence, when the marginal type is
the lowest type with whom both ﬁrms trade, a situation where ui (1 − z) > 0 is necessarily
dominated. We conclude that when the marginal type is the also lowest type with whom both
ﬁrms trade, the optimal ui(1 − z) must be equal to zero.
Ignoring monotonicity concerns, any equilibrium where the marginal type is also the lowest
type with whom ﬁrms trade is therefore characterized by




0 for k <k M
i
3k − 2 for k = kM
i
2k − 1 for k>k M
i
It can be easily veriﬁed that this mechanism also satisﬁes constraint IC.2.
Now consider an equilibrium where ﬁrms also trade with types below the marginal type. For
k ≥ kM
i , the unconstrained optimal quality is the same as above:
qi(k)=
￿
3k − 2 for k = kM
i
2k − 1 for k>k M
i
However, in this case there is the possibility that the unconstrained quality schedule might violate
the monotonicity constraint, IC.2, in which case the overall optimal quality schedule will exhibit
pooling over some interval [k0,k1].
Denote as qi(k) the unconstrained optimal quality schedule, and as qi the pooling quality
level oﬀered to k ∈ [k0,k 1]. At an optimum we have15:







Mi(ui,k )(k −qi(k)) −
1 ￿
k













Notice that for k ≤ k0 and k ≥ k1 the overall optimal quality allocation is equal to the
unconstrained quality allocation. Hence, for “suﬃciently low” and “suﬃciently high” types the
15See for instance Laﬀont-Martimort (2002).
21properties of the unconstrained quality schedule extend to the overall optimal mechanism. For
what follows, we therefore concentrate on the properties of the quality schedule obtained when
imposing condition IC.1 only. ￿
Proof of proposition 2:
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￿
, a situation where marginal type is also
the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade cannot be an equilibrium. Hence, any equilibrium must
have the ﬁrms trading also with types located below the marginal type. We then show that any
equilibrium where this is the case prescribes that the quality allocations to suﬃciently low types
are above those that would be oﬀered by a monopolist.
First step:
Consider an equilibrium where the marginal type is the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade.
Take type kM













Recall the ﬁrst order condition with respect to quality allocation:
Mi (ui,k )(k − qi (k))−
1 ￿
k











































. Hence, condition (E2) can be rewritten as






























In the equilibrium we are considering, the types located in the interval
￿





oﬀered the null contract q(k)=u(k)=0by both ﬁrms. Whenever they are located in the
competitive market, these types randomize, and contract with each ﬁrm with probability 0.5.
16This can be seen as follows: the consumer is oﬀered the null contract by both ﬁrms whenever both ki and
k−i are ≤ kM
i = kM
−i , the symmetric marginal type. Recall that k−i = 2 − z − ki.H e n c e ,k−i ≤ kM
i can also be
written as 2 − z − ki ≤ kM
i ,i . e .2 − z −kM
i ≤ ki.
22Hence, for k ∈
￿








































































































From the proof of proposition 1, we know that in any equilibrium where the marginal type is












for these in expression (14) and rearranging we obtain:
−0.75k
M2
i (1 − s)+k
M
i (3.5 − 1.5s)+s −2 (15)
Expression (15) is increasing in kM
i
17. The lowest admissible symmetric kM
i is equal to 1−0.5z18.
Hence, to prove our claim it is suﬃcient that (15) be positive when kM
i =1−0.5z. Substituting
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￿
Second step.
Consider a symmetric equilibrium where the lowest type with whom each ﬁrm trades is below
the marginal type. In that case, the mass of types that contract with ﬁrm i is equal to
Mi (ui (k),k)=

   
   
s






z for k = kM
i
1
z for k >k M
i
17The derivative ofthis expression with respect to k is equal to −1.5k(1 − s)+3 .5 − 1.5s. This expression is
positive for all k ≤ 1.
18kM
l = kM
r =1−0.5z corresponds to a situation where in the competitive market all consumers located in the
interval [0,0.5z[ contract exclusively with ﬁrm L, all consumers located in ]0.5z,z] contract exclusively with ﬁrm
R, and consumers located at 0.5z randomizes between the two ﬁrms.
23For k <k M
i , the optimal quality allocation (ignoring monotonicity concerns) satisﬁes
s
z






















dx. Now suppose that ﬁrm i is a monop-











i (k)=2 k − 1
Evaluated at qi(k)=qm





Hence, φ(k) > 0 for all k<k M
i is a suﬃcient condition to prove that, in equilibria where
the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade is below the marginal type, the quality allocation for
suﬃciently low types is above what would be oﬀered by a monopolist. We now show that at
equilibrium we must necessarily have φ(k) > 0 for all all k ≤ kM
i .
From the proof of proposition 1, we know that for all k ≤ kM



























The market share eﬀect of an upward shift in the utility schedule that initiates at some k ≤ kM
i is
equal to the extra proﬁt that the ﬁrm gains from trading with the marginal type with probability





















simply as φ. We now show by contradiction that
at equilibrium it must be the case that φ>0.































+ φ =0 (18)
If φ ≤ 0 then necessarily qi (k) <k= qFB
i (k) for all k<k M
i . Moreover, from the proof
of proposition 1, we know that the unconstrained quality schedule for k ≥ kM
i also satisﬁes
24qi(k) ≤ k = qFB
i (k), with strict inequality for all k<1. Hence, the overall optimal quality
schedule — that is, the optimal quality schedule when taking conditions IC.1 and IC.2 into
consideration — must satisfy qi(k) <k= qFB
i (k) for all k<1. Now consider kqi(k)−
qi(k)
2 −ui(k),
the proﬁt that ﬁrm i earns when trading with type k; the derivative of this expression with respect
to k gives (k − qi(k))q￿
i(k) → > 0 for all k<1. Hence, for k<k M


























But if this is the case, the equilibrium is dominated by one where the ﬁrm oﬀers ui (k)
￿ = ui (k)−ε,
for some small ε>0, and the marginal type kM￿
i is above kM
i . This brings a contradiction. Hence,
in all symmetric equilibria where the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade is below the marginal
type, the quality oﬀered to suﬃciently low types is above what would be oﬀered by a monopolist.
￿
Proof of proposition 3:
The proof consists in two steps. We ﬁrst prove that if at equilibrium we have ui (1 − z) >
0, than necessarily the optimal mechanism must prescrive overprovision for suﬃciently low
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￿
, a situation where
ui(1 −z)=0and qi(k) ≤ qFB
i (k) for all k ≤ 1 −
z
2 cannot be an equilibrium.
First step.
From the proof of proposition 1, we know that in any equilibrium where the marginal type
is the lowest type with whom ﬁrms trade, we must have ui(1 − z)=0 . Hence, ui(1 −z) > 0
at equilibrium can only occur when the marginal type is not the lowest type with whom ﬁrms





















   
   
s






z for k = kM
i
1
z for k >k M
i




















































































Now consider the optimal quality allocation for k<k M
i ; from (E2), this satisﬁes
s
z


















z + s this yields
qi(k)=2 k − 1 + z →≥ k = q
FB
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￿
, implying that at equilib-





















































i ) from constraint IC.2




















































































































￿ 1 − s
z
−s ≤ 0 (27)


















for all admissible kM
i , i.e. for all kM
i ≥ 1−0.5z. Now suppose that the overall
optimal mechanism — that is, the optimal mechanism derived when taking both conditions IC.1
and IC.2 into consideration — satisﬁes qi(k) ≤ qFB
i (k) for all k ≤ kM






cannot be below 3kM
i − 2, the optimal quality allocation when taking only
condition IC.1 into account19. Hence, kM
i and 3kM







i −2 for all kM
i ≥ 1−0.5z. To establish our claim, it is therefore
suﬃcient to prove that, when evaluated at these two values, the lefthandside of (27) is strictly
positive for any kM













i +1 2 s +4 z − 22k
M
i s − 6k
M
i z − 8sz +6 k
M




i s − 12
￿
(28)
19This is because if the overall optimal mechanism contains pooling, this must occur to prevent the quality
schedule from being decreasing in type over some interval. We know that for k ∈ [1 −0.5z,1], the quality allocation
calculated when taking only condition IC.1 into consideration does not violate IC.2. Hence, if pooling occurs over
some interval that includes type 1−0.5z this must be because a downward jump in the the unconstrained quality
schedule occurs at some type ≤ 1 − 0.5z. The pooling quality level must therefore be ≥ 1 − 1.5z,t h eo p t i m a l
quality allocation oﬀered to 1 − 0.5z when taking only condition IC.1 into account.
27Expression (28) is strictly increasing in kM
i
20. Hence, if expression (28) is strictly positive when
kM
i = 1 − 0.5z, it is also strictly positive for all kM











− 1 − s (29)


























i z − 4sz +2 k
M




i s − 4
￿
(30)
Expression (30) is strictly increasing in kM
i
21. Hence, if expression (30) is strictly positive when
kM
i = 1 − 0.5z, it is also strictly positive for all kM











− 1 − s (31)
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￿
This is exactly the same condition as that which guarantees that expression (29) is strictly posi-
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￿
, a situation where ui(1 −z)=
u−i (1 − z)=0and qi (k)=q−i (k) ≤ qFB(k) for all k cannot be an equilibrium. ￿
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